Research Overview
My research explores how the context of a close interpersonal relationship should change our theorizing about common moral concepts. Currently, I focus on consenting and blaming. I argue that in close relationships, it takes more to respect each other’s consent and to blame each other appropriately than it takes in more distant relationships.
My dissertation concerns consent and blame primarily within close sexual relationships. In the first two chapters, I argue that consent can be undermined in far subtler ways than we often recognize. My specific focus is on illuminating how people can be blamed into nonconsensual sex, though my arguments generalize beyond blame and beyond sex. In my third chapter, I argue that in some cases of nonconsensual sex, it is impermissibly meddlesome for a 'third party’ – someone who is neither the victim nor the perpetrator – to express blame to the perpetrator. This result, I contend, will help us to stop neglecting certain kinds of nonconsensual sex.
In the near-term, I plan to develop additional projects on these topics. In the longer-term, I plan to explore more directly a research interest underlying all these projects – what makes a close relationship, especially a romantic relationship, healthy? What makes a relationship abusive?
My research explores how the context of a close interpersonal relationship should change our theorizing about common moral concepts. Currently, I focus on consenting and blaming. I argue that in close relationships, it takes more to respect each other’s consent and to blame each other appropriately than it takes in more distant relationships.
My dissertation concerns consent and blame primarily within close sexual relationships. In the first two chapters, I argue that consent can be undermined in far subtler ways than we often recognize. My specific focus is on illuminating how people can be blamed into nonconsensual sex, though my arguments generalize beyond blame and beyond sex. In my third chapter, I argue that in some cases of nonconsensual sex, it is impermissibly meddlesome for a 'third party’ – someone who is neither the victim nor the perpetrator – to express blame to the perpetrator. This result, I contend, will help us to stop neglecting certain kinds of nonconsensual sex.
In the near-term, I plan to develop additional projects on these topics. In the longer-term, I plan to explore more directly a research interest underlying all these projects – what makes a close relationship, especially a romantic relationship, healthy? What makes a relationship abusive?
Papers
Below, I have included brief abstracts of my dissertation chapters. I have also included abstracts for additional projects on the ethics of consent, blame, and interpersonal withdrawal, as well as a few projects on epistemic injustice that are currently on the back-burner. (For each project, click the title to see the abstract).
Below, I have included brief abstracts of my dissertation chapters. I have also included abstracts for additional projects on the ethics of consent, blame, and interpersonal withdrawal, as well as a few projects on epistemic injustice that are currently on the back-burner. (For each project, click the title to see the abstract).
"Consent, Blame, and Sex" (Dissertation Chapters)
A paper on being sulked into sex [title redacted, R&R ]
Sometimes, people sulk when their partners refuse sex. For instance, they might angrily pout or initiate a silent treatment. To avoid this sulking, those on the receiving end sometimes submit to sex they don’t want. I argue, first, that even attempting to sulk someone into sex often imposes wrongful blame. Second, I argue that succeeding at sulking someone into sex often renders that sex nonconsensual because coerced. Finally, I extend these arguments to numerous other pressures that use blame to induce agreement to sex - or even to nonsexual activities. It follows that we should attend more closely to subtle sexual and nonsexual pressures, especially within the distinctive dynamic of close relationships, than we currently do.
'Do I Have To?': Moral Ignorance and Consent
It is a commonplace that non-moral ignorance can undermine consent, as when a partner hides an STD to secure sex. But can moral ignorance also undermine consent, as when a partner deceives you into thinking that sex is a marital duty? Yes, or so I argue. No matter how we flesh out the informational requirements for consent, we have strong reason to believe that they are symmetrical; they apply to moral information in exactly the same ways as to non-moral information. This symmetry, it turns out, is surprisingly difficult to establish; has a number of real-world upshots in sexual and non-sexual domains of consent; and raises a host of independently interesting questions about consent.
Meddlesome Blame for Nonconsensual Sex
We might be tempted to think that nonconsensual sex is the kind of wrong that is always everyone's business - even when a victim does not want third-party involvement. I argue otherwise. In some cases, it can be impermissibly meddlesome for a third party to communicate blame to a perpetrator of nonconsensual sex. A primary upshot is that the category of 'nonconsensual sex' is more capacious than we might have realized.
Additional Projects on the Ethics of Consent, Blame, and Interpersonal Withdrawal
Consent, Fairness, and Friendship
The standards for what it takes to respect someone's consent are sensitive to the standards for what it takes to treat them fairly. The standards for what it takes to treat someone fairly are sensitive to the nature of your relationship with them. Standards for consent, then, are relationship-sensitive. For instance, because it takes more to treat a close partner fairly, it takes more to respect their consent. In this project, I defend this picture of consent and draw out its implications for consent within close relationships.
Peremptory Blame
Sometimes, a blamer prevents their target from challenging their blame. Someone might, for instance, stomp out of the room after declaring to their partner, ‘I don’t want to hear your excuses! You messed up, and that’s that.’ Is this kind of peremptory blame, especially within close relationships, impermissible? If so, when, and why? In this project, I aim to answer this question, drawing on principles relating to conversational reciprocity. I also aim to identify what parallels might exist between norms of interpersonal peremptory blame and norms of social peremptory blame - or, more colloquially, norms of ‘cancellation’.
“What I See with My Eyes”: Tarabai Shinde on Blaming Atmospheres
In 1882, Tarabai Shinde wrote the first modern Indian feminist text, Stri Purush Tulana (A Comparison Between Women and Men). In her book, Shinde describes how a husband’s pervasive, frequent blame of a wife can imbue the relationship with (what I call) an asymmetrical ‘atmosphere’ of blame. When enveloped in such an atmosphere, a wife walks on eggshells to avoid her husband’s blame and yet still feels like she is always being blamed. In this project, I aim to offer an account of an asymmetrical blaming atmosphere; explain how such an atmosphere can be abusive and oppressive; and describe how one might resist such an atmosphere. More generally, I seek to move the blame literature to discuss not only blaming exchanges, but also patterns of blaming exchanges.
Stalking by Withdrawing
Prototypically, a stalker repeatedly approaches their victim, e.g., via surveillance. It is in this way that they can persistently capture the attention of their victim. But close relationships, I argue, enable a different, seemingly paradoxical form of (quasi-)stalking. When someone repeatedly withdraws from their partner - say, by retreating into an angry sulk - their partner is called to attend to them, identifying what might be wrong and how to help. This is because close relationships demand a closer kind of attention to each other. Hence, in such relationships, you can stalk a partner by withdrawing from them.
Must I Redeem You?
Suppose that a close friend or partner gradually becomes arrogant and disrespectful towards you. After you point out this vice, they apologize, but they still need more time to improve and thereby redeem themselves. Suppose further that you no longer find this friendship fulfilling, and so you end it rather than helping your friend redeem themselves. Have you wronged them? In this project, I argue that the answer might sometimes be ‘yes’. More generally, you can be duty-bound to help a friend redeem themselves - even when it is you they have wronged. Even more generally, the association involved in a close relationship can commit you to surprising forms of further association.
Projects on Epistemic Injustice
Memorial Injustice
The literature on epistemic injustice focuses on how we can be wronged in our status as epistemic ‘subjects’. In this project, I argue that we can be wronged in our status as epistemic ‘objects.’ Specifically, I argue that individuals, qua objects of a given memory, can have a claim against that memory being attributed less significance than the relevant epistemic context warrants. To illustrate this argument, I discuss the prejudicial exclusion of Native American contributions to paleontology from 20th century paleontological histories.
Our Philosophical Canon Enacts Testimonial Injustice
This project expands the boundaries of ‘testimonial injustice': not only can we prejudicially deflate the credibility of someone’s testimony, but also the significance of one’s testimony (for the epistemic task at hand). This latter variety of testimonial injustice, I argue, is often present in the construction of a philosophical canon.
Intersectionality, Improper Allocation of Credit, and Epistemic Injustice
Sometimes, you are unjustly denied credit for successfully exercising your epistemic capacities - like a boss unjustly crediting your colleague for your idea. Such a denial of credit, Emmalon Davis argues, can wrongfully thwart your capability for further epistemic contributions. I argue that such a denial of credit can wrong you even if it does not thwart your capability for further epistemic contributions. I also aim to identify some concrete steps towards bringing about epistemically just credit attribution within philosophy, drawing on the example of intersectionality theorists being unjustly denied credit for their ideas.