Research Overview
In my research, I investigate consent and blame within close relationships. I argue that in such relationships, it takes more to respect each other’s consent and to blame each other appropriately than it takes in more distant relationships. Recently, I’ve been particularly focused on exploring the nuances of how the notion of meddlesomeness relates to blame and consent. In the longer-term, I plan to explore more directly a research interest underlying all my projects – what makes a close relationship, especially a romantic relationship, healthy? What makes a relationship unhealthy or abusive?
For more detail about my research projects and how they fit together, see my research statement; for more detail about my dissertation work in particular, see my dissertation abstract. You can access my full dissertation, "Consent, Blame, and Sex," here, but note that each paper in the dissertation has changed since my defense! I am happy to provide more recent versions of the papers upon request.
In my research, I investigate consent and blame within close relationships. I argue that in such relationships, it takes more to respect each other’s consent and to blame each other appropriately than it takes in more distant relationships. Recently, I’ve been particularly focused on exploring the nuances of how the notion of meddlesomeness relates to blame and consent. In the longer-term, I plan to explore more directly a research interest underlying all my projects – what makes a close relationship, especially a romantic relationship, healthy? What makes a relationship unhealthy or abusive?
For more detail about my research projects and how they fit together, see my research statement; for more detail about my dissertation work in particular, see my dissertation abstract. You can access my full dissertation, "Consent, Blame, and Sex," here, but note that each paper in the dissertation has changed since my defense! I am happy to provide more recent versions of the papers upon request.
Projects on the Ethics of Consent, Blame, and Interpersonal Withdrawal
For each project, click the title to see the abstract.
For each project, click the title to see the abstract.
Sulking into Sex: Blame, Coercion, and Consent [published in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2024]
Sometimes, people sulk when their partners refuse sex. For instance, they might angrily pout or initiate a silent treatment. To avoid this sulking, those on the receiving end sometimes submit to sex they don’t want. I argue, first, that even attempting to sulk someone into sex often imposes wrongful blame. Second, I argue that succeeding at sulking someone into sex often renders that sex nonconsensual because coerced. Finally, I extend these arguments to numerous other pressures that use blame to induce agreement to sex - or even to nonsexual activities. It follows that we should attend more closely to subtle sexual and nonsexual pressures, especially within the distinctive dynamic of close relationships.
Do I Have To? Moral Ignorance and Consent [draft available]
It is a commonplace that non-moral ignorance can undermine consent, as when a partner hides an STD to secure sex. But can moral ignorance also undermine consent, as when a partner deceives you into thinking that sex is a marital duty? Yes, or so I argue. No matter how we flesh out the informational requirements for consent, we have strong reason to believe that they are symmetrical; they apply to moral information in exactly the same ways as they apply to non-moral information. This symmetry, it turns out, is surprisingly difficult to establish; has a number of real-world upshots in sexual and non-sexual domains of consent; and raises a host of independently interesting questions about consent.
Consent, Fairness, and Friendship [in progress]
The standards for what it takes to respect someone's consent are sensitive to the standards for what it takes to treat them fairly. The standards for what it takes to treat someone fairly are sensitive to the nature of your relationship with them. Standards for consent, then, are relationship-sensitive. For instance, because it takes more to treat a close partner fairly, it takes more to respect their consent. In this project, I defend this picture of consent and draw out its implications for consent within close relationships.
Meddlesome Blame for Nonconsensual Sex [draft available]
It's widely believed that nonconsensual sex is always everyone's business. In other words, nonconsensual sex warrants not just a victim’s expression of blame, but also the expressed blame of third parties, via social censure, criminal punishment, etc. I argue otherwise. I start by noting the common-sense view that third-party blame for non-sexual wrongs can be impermissibly meddlesome. This view rests on varied considerations: privacy; a victim’s interest in controlling the process of moral repair; etc. These considerations, I argue, equally apply to nonconsensual sex. One primary upshot is that the category of 'nonconsensual sex' is more capacious than we might have realized. It includes even cases in which third-party blame seems inappropriate.
The Messiness of Meddlesomeness [draft available]
Suppose that you do something wrong. If I am not the victim of your wrongdoing - I am instead a 'third party' - it can sometimes be meddlesome for me to express blame to you. But what exactly makes a given expression of blame from a third party to a wrongdoer count as 'meddlesome'? This paper aims to answer that question. I start by giving some criteria that a correct account of meddlesome blame must meet - and argue that these criteria rule out almost all extant accounts. I then develop and defend an account from Gabe Mendlow, an account that takes meddlesomeness to be inextricably messy. Along the way, I discuss a number of interesting features of meddlesomeness. To mention some examples: meddlesome blame can wrong the wrongdoer, not just the victim; the meddlesomeness of an expression of blame can change in the course of that expression; even praise can be meddlesome; and even the blame of a victim can sometimes be meddlesome.
Peremptory Blame [in progress]
Sometimes, a blamer prevents their target from challenging their blame. Someone might, for instance, stomp out of the room after declaring to their partner, ‘I don’t want to hear your excuses! You messed up, and that’s that.’ Is this kind of peremptory blame, especially within close relationships, defective? If so, how? In this project, I aim to answer this question. My working hypothesis is that the reciprocity underlying close relationships makes it uniquely difficult to justify peremptorily blaming a partner. I also aim to identify what parallels might exist between norms of interpersonal peremptory blame and norms of social peremptory blame - or, more colloquially, norms of ‘cancellation’.
"What I See with My Eyes": Tarabai Shinde on Men Blaming Women [in progress]
In 1882, Tarabai Shinde wrote Stri Purush Tulana (A Comparison Between Women and Men). In her groundbreaking book, Shinde describes how a husband’s pervasive, frequent blame of a wife can imbue the relationship with (what I call) an 'asymmetrical blaming mood'. When enveloped in such a mood, a wife walks on eggshells to avoid her husband’s blame and yet still feels like she is always being blamed. In this project, I aim to offer an account of an asymmetrical blaming mood. In particular, I explore: does the defectiveness of an asymmetrical blaming mood reduce to the flaw of repeated instances of unfitting blame? Or does its defectiveness partly reside in the pattern that exists over and above those instances? Part of the big-picture point is to encourage the blame literature to do more theorizing about patterns of blaming exchanges.
Stalking by Withdrawing [in progress]
Prototypically, a stalker repeatedly approaches their victim, e.g., via surveillance. It is in this way that they can persistently take over the attention of their victim. But close relationships, I argue, enable a different, seemingly paradoxical form of (quasi-)stalking. In such relationships, when someone withdraws from their partner - say, by retreating into an angry sulk - their partner is called to attend to them, identifying what might be wrong and how to help. But when their withdrawal is habitual, they can persistently take over the attention of their partner. Hence, in close relationships, you can stalk a partner by withdrawing from them.
Must I Redeem You? [in progress]
Suppose that a close friend or partner gradually becomes arrogant and disrespectful towards you. After you point out this vice, they apologize, but they still need more time to improve and thereby redeem themselves. Suppose further that you no longer find this friendship fulfilling, and so you end it rather than helping your friend redeem themselves. Have you wronged them? In this project, I argue that the answer might sometimes be ‘yes’. In other words, you can be duty-bound to help a friend redeem themselves - even when it is you they have wronged. More generally, the association involved in a close relationship can commit you to surprising forms of further association.
Projects on Epistemic Injustice
Below are descriptions of some projects on epistemic injustice that are currently on the back-burner. For each project, click the title to see the abstract.
Below are descriptions of some projects on epistemic injustice that are currently on the back-burner. For each project, click the title to see the abstract.
Memorial Injustice
The literature on epistemic injustice focuses on how we can be wronged in our status as epistemic ‘subjects’. In this project, I argue that we can be wronged in our status as epistemic ‘objects.’ Specifically, I argue that individuals, qua objects of a given memory, can have a claim against that memory being attributed less significance than the relevant epistemic context warrants. To illustrate this argument, I discuss the prejudicial exclusion of Native American contributions to paleontology from 20th century paleontological histories.
Our Philosophical Canon Enacts Testimonial Injustice
This project expands the boundaries of ‘testimonial injustice': not only can we prejudicially deflate the credibility of someone’s testimony, but also the significance of one’s testimony (for the epistemic task at hand). This latter variety of testimonial injustice, I argue, is often present in the construction of a philosophical canon.
Intersectionality, Improper Allocation of Credit, and Epistemic Injustice
Sometimes, you are unjustly denied credit for successfully exercising your epistemic capacities - like a boss unjustly crediting your colleague for your idea. Such a denial of credit, Emmalon Davis argues, can wrongfully thwart your capability for further epistemic contributions. I argue that such a denial of credit can wrong you even if it does not thwart your capability for further epistemic contributions. I also aim to identify some concrete steps towards bringing about epistemically just credit attribution within philosophy, drawing on the example of intersectionality theorists being unjustly denied credit for their ideas.